Duke Law Journal Online
VOLUME 67

SEPTEMBER

2018

WHAT DOES PUERTO RICAN CITIZENSHIP
MEAN FOR PUERTO RICO’S LEGAL STATUS?
JOSEPH BLOCHER & MITU GULATI†
“There are 3.7 million American citizens living in Puerto Rico. As
citizens, they should be entitled to determine for themselves their
political status.”1
– President Donald Trump

In Race and Representation Revisited: The New Racial
Gerrymandering Cases and Section 2 of the VRA, Guy-Uriel Charles
and Luis Fuentes-Rohwer explore the Voting Rights Act in a novel
way.2 They focus on the aspects of the Act that, from the beginning,
made it vulnerable to “exit,” and eventually led to the “judicially
enforced exit” that manifested in Shelby County v. Holder.3 This theme
of cross-branch exit appears in many of the other contributions to this
symposium, from Curt Bradley’s focus on executive-led exit from
treaties4 to Jim Salzman and J.B. Ruhl’s exploration of “presidential
exit” not only from prior presidential actions, but from statutory
commitments.5
We approach the theme of exit from the other direction:
limitations on exit, especially those that are tied to voting and
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1. Chris Bodenner, The State of Puerto Rican Statehood, THE ATLANTIC, Mar. 7, 2016,
http://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2016/03/the-state-of-puerto-rican-statehood/472599 (emphasis
added) [https://perma.cc/A6W6-XC8E].
2. Guy-Uriel Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Race and Representation Revisited: The New
Racial Gerrymandering Cases and Section 2 of the VRA, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1559 (2018).
3. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
4. Curtis A. Bradley, Exiting Congressional-Executive Agreements, 67 DUKE L.J. 1615
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5. Jim Salzman & J. B. Ruhl, Presidential Exit, 67 DUKE L.J. 1687 (2018).
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citizenship. What of “judicially forbidden exit”? What bonds can the
government not break?
To us, a fascinating test case is Puerto Rico—what FuentesRohwer has called “the land that democratic theory forgot.”6 The evils
that the VRA was designed to address seem mild in comparison to the
situation on the island, where people cannot vote at all in Presidential
elections.7 Perhaps to the surprise of many Americans on the mainland,
though, Puerto Ricans are American citizens, and have been for more
than a century. The precise incidents of that citizenship are still, even a
century later, murky.8 But it is undeniable that Puerto Ricans have
some kind of status in the American legal system that they did not have
when the island was originally acquired in the 1800s.
As for the island itself, its legal status is also dubious. Indeed,
many scholars have noted the ways in which the island’s second-class
status lays a foundation for the second-class citizenship of its residents.9
Puerto Rico is not a state, but it is not a foreign country. It is, in the
words of the Supreme Court, “foreign in a domestic sense”10—a socalled “unincorporated territory.” That classification has implications
not only for the past and present treatment of the island, but also for
its future.
Perhaps most ominously, prominent scholars have suggested that
Puerto Rico’s status leaves open the possibility that the island might be
“de-annexed”—expelled—from the remainder of the United States.11
6. Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Land that Democratic Theory Forgot, 83 IND. L.J. 1525, 1526
(2008).
7. José D. Román, Trying to Fit an Oval Shaped Island into a Square Constitution:
Arguments for Puerto Rican Statehood, 29 FORDHAM URBAN L. J. 1681, 1682 (2002).
8. JOSÉ A. CABRANES, CITIZENSHIP AND THE AMERICAN EMPIRE: NOTES ON THE
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP OF PUERTO RICANS 5 n.12 (1979)
(“The content of the concept of national citizenship under American law had been, and continues
to be, less than definite or clear.”).
9. See, e.g., Gustavo A. Gelpi, Comment on Blocher & Gulati, “Puerto Rico and the Right
of Accession”, 43 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE (2018), https://www.yjil.yale.edu/comment-onblocher-gulatis-puerto-rico-and-the-right-of-accession [https://perma.cc/35FA-8F4E]; Lisa Maria
Perez, Citizenship Denied: The Insular Cases and the Fourteenth Amendment, 94 VA. L. REV. 1029
(2008).
10. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 341–42 (1901) (White, J., concurring) (“The result of
what has been said is that whilst in an international sense Porto Rico was not a foreign country,
since it was . . . owned by the United States, it was foreign to the United States in a domestic sense,
because the island has not been incorporated into the United States, but was merely appurtenant
thereto as a possession.”) (emphasis added). See generally FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE:
PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION AND THE CONSTITUTION 39, 40–41 (Christina Duffy
Burnett & Burke Marshall eds. 2001) (hereinafter FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE).
11. Christina Duffy Burnett, Untied States: American Expansion and Territorial
Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 798–99 (2005); see also CABRANES, supra note 8, at 50.
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We have written elsewhere about the question of what international
and domestic law have to say about the expulsion of former colonies
generally12 and Puerto Rico in particular.13
The question motivating this paper is different, but builds on the
expulsion possibility, considering it in light of the connection between
citizenship and the island’s status. We ask: What happens to citizenship
rights if Congress decides it is time to give Puerto Rico “independence”
against its will? More broadly, we are probing the tension between a
strong individual right (citizenship) and a potentially weak collective
right (the right of Puerto Rico to remain part of the United States,
which is arguably revocable by Congress on a whim).14 We argue that
the strong citizenship rights enjoyed by Puerto Ricans today—granted
by statute, and solidified by nearly a century of historical practice—are
not compatible with an unrestrained power of Congress to expel the
island.
The next natural question is which of the two propositions must
give way: Do Puerto Ricans lose whatever citizenship rights they have,
or does Congress lose whatever expulsion power it has? We argue that
Puerto Rican citizenship effectively trumps, in legal and practical
terms, any congressional power of expulsion.
If we are right, there could be significant implications, in particular
for the continuing viability of the Insular Cases—the Supreme Court
decisions that created the category of “unincorporated territory” and
relegated Puerto Rico to it. In effect, Puerto Rican citizenship provides
strong evidence that, to quote language from later Supreme Court
cases, “over time the ties between the United States and any of its
unincorporated territories” have “strengthen[ed] in ways that are of
constitutional significance.”15
I.

PUERTO RICAN CITIZENSHIP AND PUERTO RICO’S
STATUS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN LINKED

To determine how the US citizenship of Puerto Ricans and Puerto
Rico’s political status within the US might interact to change Puerto

12. Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Forced Secessions, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215 (2017).
13. Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Expulsion, Statehood, and the Future of Puerto Rico, 43
YALE J. INT’L L. 229 (2018).
14. This tension between individual and collective rights has, of course, been recognized and
explored elsewhere. E.g., WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL
THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1996).
15. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 758 (2008).
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Rico’s current status, it is helpful to know how the two features began,
and how they are related.
Puerto Rican citizenship has been disadvantaged ever since the
island was acquired by the United States following the SpanishAmerican War. The United States had acquired inhabited territories
by treaty in the past—the Louisiana Purchase being the most obvious
example—and had always made provision for the citizenship of the
people and the eventual statehood of the area.16 That was not the case
for Puerto Rico. Although Puerto Ricans had been entitled to some
citizenship rights under the Spanish,17 Article IX of the Treaty of Paris
took away those rights without correspondingly guaranteeing U.S.
citizenship. Instead, Congress was given power to “determine[]” their
“civil rights and political status.”18 From the outset, then, the legal
status of the island and its inhabitants was unclear. That limbo, and a
political moment that focused attention on the question of American
empire, generated an incredible outpouring of public discussion19 and
legal scholarship.20
It also generated legislation. In 1900, Congress passed the Foraker
21
Act, whose sponsor said it was designed “to recognize that Puerto
Rico belongs to the United States of America.”22 The Act not only
denied statehood to Puerto Rico, but disadvantaged it even vis-à-vis
other territories. As Christina Duffy Ponsa-Kraus notes:
[M]ost significantly, Congress had declined to extend
the US Constitution by statute to Puerto Rico, as it had
16. Juan F. Perea, Fulfilling Manifest Destiny: Conquest, Race, and the Insular Cases, in
RECONSIDERING THE INSULAR CASES: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN IMPERIALISM
156 (Gerald L. Neuman & Tomiko-Brown Nagin eds. 2015) [hereinafter RECONSIDERING]
(calling this the first time that “in a treaty acquiring territory for the United States, there was no
promise of citizenship . . . [nor any] promise, actual or implied, of statehood”).
17. Rogers M. Smith, The Bitter Roots of Puerto Rican Citizenship, in FOREIGN IN A
DOMESTIC SENSE supra note 10, at 373, 375 (noting that Puerto Rican home rule status was only
conferred in 1897, before which “most Puerto Ricans, it seems, had long been content to be
Spanish subjects, without a legally recognized, independent Puerto Rican nationality”).
18. Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain, U.S.Spain, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754.
19. CABRANES, supra note 8, at 4.
20. See, e.g., Simeon E. Baldwin, The Constitutional Questions Incident to the Acquisition
and Government by the United States of Island Territory, 12 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1899); C.C.
Langdell, The Status of Our New Territories, 12 HARV. L. REV. 365 (1899); Abbott Lawrence
Lowell, The Status of Our New Possessions—A Third View, 13 HARV. L. REV. 155 (1899); Carman
F. Randolph, Constitutional Aspects of Annexation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 291 (1898); James Bradley
Thayer, Our New Possessions, 12 HARV. L. REV. 464 (1899).
21. Organic Act of 1900 (Foraker Act), ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77 (1900) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 48 U.S.C. (2013)).
22. 33 Cong. Rec. 2473 (1900) (statement of Sen. Foraker).
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done in all prior territories. Moreover, instead of
granting US citizenship to the island’s inhabitants, it
declared native-born Puerto Ricans ‘citizens of Porto
Rico,’ a nebulous and undefined status that amounted
to little more than an embellished form of
statelessness.23
The citizenship limbo permitted by the Treaty of Paris and
established by the Foraker Act would later be echoed by the Supreme
Court in the Insular Cases, which confronted the question of the
island’s legal status vis-à-vis the United States. That question has been
addressed elsewhere, and—despite general neglect in the legal
academy—fortunately has attracted increasing attention in recent
years.24 The Court’s answer was, to put it mildly, not entirely
satisfactory. In brief, the Justices concluded that Puerto Rico was an
“unincorporated territory”—a novel category with an odd relationship
to the mainland. U.S. territories, of course, had existed before, and all
of them had eventually been made into states. But unincorporated
territories lacked that constitutional trajectory, leaving serious
questions about what they can demand or reject.
Most relevantly for this symposium’s theme of “exit,” eminent
jurists have found evidence suggesting that the Insular Cases were
written to preserve the United States’ option to expel Puerto Rico.25
Judge José Cabranes writes, “the doctrine seemed to leave open the
possibility that, for one reason or another, the United States might
‘dispose’ of its insular territories.”26 Legal historian Christina Duffy
Ponsa-Kraus documents the evidence supporting this argument at
length in her article, “Untied States: American Expansion and
Territorial Deannexation.”27
These statutes and Supreme Court decisions put the island, as a
political entity, and its people, as political actors, in limbo. Individual
citizenship and territorial status were both sorted into novel and, within
our legal system, unique categories. But they were also linked in law
and practice, even though, technically speaking, they need not be
23. Christina Duffy Ponsa, When Statehood was Autonomy, in RECONSIDERING, supra note
16, at 27.
24. See, e.g., FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE, supra note 10; RECONSIDERING supra note16.
25. Baldwin, supra note 20 (suggesting that a “conqueror” of territory “may not be able to
retrain what he receives”); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have power to
dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property
belonging to the United States. . . .”).
26. CABRANES, supra note 8, at 50.
27. Burnett, supra note 11.
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completely coincidental. There is no conceptual need for citizenship
and territorial status to rise or fall together. It is easy enough to imagine
American citizens living on non-state or even non-American soil.
That’s what expatriates do. Nor is it inconceivable to imagine the
creation of a new state whose residents would not immediately and
automatically become citizens. But as a practical matter, there is
something bizarre about the notion that something as strong, integral,
and constitutionally significant as citizenship is revocable by Congress
with no consent of the individual. More concretely, it would be
laughable to think that Congress could strip the hypothetical John
Paulson, who resides somewhere between Aspen and New York, of
this citizenship for no reason (indeed, it might not be possible to do so
for most, and maybe all, reasons).28 Yet, if John is a Puerto Rican living
in Puerto Rico, which is also US soil, he can be stripped of his
citizenship on a whim of Congress? Surely not. If that is the case: What
follows?
As a matter of US law and practice, citizenship and territorial
status are deeply intertwined, as political leaders in Puerto Rico have
long recognized. Even in 1916, Puerto Rico’s resident commissioner,
Luis Muñoz Rivera, spoke for many when he said: “Give us statehood
and your glorious citizenship will be welcome to us and to our children.
If you deny us statehood, we decline your citizenship, frankly, proudly,
as befits a people who … will preserve their conception of honor, which
none can take from them . . . .”29
Notably, that same year, the Jones Act of 1916 pledged eventual
independence to the Philippines30—a promise that was fulfilled in
1946.31 That independence can be explained in part by the fact that the
Filipinos fought hard for it.32 But it might also have to do with the fact
that the territory had become expensive for the mainland, especially as
more and more relatively poor Filipinos migrated to the US
mainland.33 And that, in turn, may help explain why, in addition to
28. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
29. 53 Cong. Rec. 7472 (1916) (statement of Resident Commissioner Rivera) (quoted in
CABRANES, supra note 8, at 89).
30. Jones Act (Philippine Islands), ch. 416, 39 Stat. 545 (1916) (preamble).
31. 22 U.S.C. 1394 (1976).
32. E.g., Reynaldo C. Ileto, The Philippine-American War: Friendship and Forgetting in
VESTIGES OF WAR: THE PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN WAR AND THE AFTERMATH OF AN IMPERIAL
DREAM 1899-1999, at 3, 7 (Angel Velasco Shaw & Luis H. Francia eds. 2002).
33. E.g., H.W. BRANDS, BOUND TO EMPIRE: THE UNITED STATES AND THE PHILIPPINES
160 (1992). More generally, on the tension between the desire for expanding empire and the
desire to keep out the racial “others”, see NOEL MAURER, THE EMPIRE TRAP: THE RISE AND
FALL OF U.S. INTERVENTION TO PROTECT AMERICAN PROPERTY OVERSEAS 1893–2013 (2013).
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independence for the Philippines, the relevant treaty also stripped
Filipinos of their nationality.34 Back then, we imagine no one blinked
an eyelid at the fact that the hypothetical John Paulsons from New
York, who happened to be living in Manila at the time, would get to
retain their US citizenship.
As for Puerto Rico, the deal proposed by Rivera and other
political leaders—citizenship only with statehood to accompany it—
was effectively declined. In 1917, another Jones Act conferred
American citizenship on Puerto Ricans.35 But as Cabranes notes, “the
citizenship that was granted was not complete,” and the “very word
‘citizenship’ suggested equality of rights and privileges and full
membership in the American political community, thereby obscuring
the colonial relationship between a great metropolitan state and a poor
overseas dependency.”36 Cabranes concludes that “[b]y extending
United States citizenship to the Puerto Ricans after promising
independence to the Filipinos, Congress intended to do little more than
proclaim the permanence of Puerto Rico’s political links with the
United States.”37
Some, however, interpreted the signals differently, and thought
that statehood would follow citizenship. As a former governor of
Puerto Rico put it, an “implied pledge of statehood [was] made to
Puerto Ricans when citizenship was granted.”38 He was not alone. It
was “widely believed that it would only be a matter of time until this
‘transitory phase’ would end in statehood.”39

34. See Jones Act (Philippine Islands), ch. 416, 39 Stat. 545 (1916) (preamble declares
intention of United States to recognize the independence of the Philippine Islands); Treaty of
General Relations and Protocol, 61 Stat. 1174, TIAS 1568, 7 UNTS 3 (1946) (“Treaty of Manila
of 1946”).
35. Jones Act (Puerto Rico), ch. 145, § 5, 39 Stat. 951 (1917) (current version at 8 U.S.C. S
1402 (1976)).
36. CABRANES, supra note 8, at 6–7.
37. Id. at 15. Cabranes also concludes that it was purely coincidental that citizenship was
extended a month before the United States entered World War I, as there is no evidence that
Puerto Ricans were to be used as troops, and would have been subject to the draft in any event.
Id. 14–16. More recently uncovered evidence suggests otherwise. See Bartholomew Sparrow &
Jennifer Lamm, Puerto Ricans and U.S. Citizenship in 1917: Imperatives of Security, 29 CENTRO
J. 284, 285–86 (2017). In any event, the territories provide far more than their proportionate share
of service members. See Landess Kearns, Military Veterans Living in US Territories Sue for Right
to Vote, HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 19, 2015, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/veterans-usterritories-sue-for-right-to-vote_us_564d1acce4b031745cefcf2a [https://perma.cc/VW3P-HN3J].
38. CABRANES, supra note 8, at 7 n.19 (quoting Address by Governor Carlos Romero
Barceló, before Los Angeles World Affairs Council (Dec. 6, 1977)) (alteration in original).
39. GERT OOSTINDIE & INGE KLINKERS, DECOLONISING THE CARIBBEAN: DUTCH
POLICIES IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 46 (2003).
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Has that time finally come?
II.

IS PUERTO RICAN CITIZENSHIP CONSISTENT WITH A
CONGRESSIONAL POWER OF EXPULSION?

The Territories Clause undoubtedly gives Congress great power
over the territories. When it comes to uninhabited territories, that
power might well include the power to cede or transfer. But that does
not necessarily mean that Puerto Rico—inhabited by millions of US
citizens—is subject to the same plenary power.40 When an enumerated
congressional power runs into a rights-based limitation, it must yield.41
And it follows that if Puerto Rican citizenship (a right) is inconsistent
with the power to expel (a power), then the latter gives way.
To take one example, we think it clear that the Equal Protection
Clause would prevent Congress from expelling Puerto Rico from the
United States because of racially discriminatory animus and with the
goal of harming the overwhelmingly Hispanic citizens of the island.
Racial animus directed at American citizens is the bête noir of Equal
Protection, after all.42 The same would of course be true of any effort
to strip them of citizenship on that basis. (For that reason, among
others, we suspect that the US treatment of the Filipinos’ nationality in
the wake of the Philippines independence would not pass
constitutional muster today.)
One might take the fallback position that Puerto Rican citizenship
is simply a matter of statutory grace (if it is a constitutional imperative
then the answers are even more clear43), but that would not necessarily
avoid an Equal Protection challenge. If anything, it would compound

40. Similar points could be made about acquisition of territories. E. Robert Statham Jr., U.S.
Territorial Expansion: Extended Republicanism versus Hyperextended Expansionism, in FOREIGN
IN A DOMESTIC SENSE, supra note 10, at 167, 177 (“To contend that the Constitution (and the
Territorial Clause in particular) gives complete power over and ownership of territorial
acquisitions and their inhabitants is to treat inhabitants as property to be disposed of at the
pleasure of Congress, a single branch of the national government. . . . Whereas the United States
has the right to acquire territory, it has no right whatsoever to acquire people.”); id. at 173 (“States
are created by people and are subsequently admitted into the Union. Territory is property, and
is, therefore, distinct from people and citizenship.”).
41. For an illuminating discussion of the point, see H. Jefferson Powell, Targeting
Americans: The Constitutionality of the U.S. Drone War 38–42 (2016).
42. See generally WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ANIMUS: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE
LAW (2017).
43. Juan R. Torruella, The Insular Cases: A Declaration of Their Bankruptcy and My
Harvard Pronouncement, in RECONSIDERING, supra note 16, at 69 (“This is clearly in direct
contravention to the Constitution—the source from which civil and political rights and status
emanate, not Congress. . . .”).
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the problem, since the citizenship statutes themselves were infected
with racial bias.44 The Supreme Court in Downes v. Bidwell suggested
as much: “Indeed, it is doubtful if Congress would ever assent to
annexation of territory upon the condition that its inhabitants, however
foreign they may be to our habits, traditions and modes of life, shall
become at once citizens of the United States.”45
Of course, Downes says “at once,” and the argument is not that
Puerto Ricans became citizens at the moment the island was annexed.
The argument, instead, is that the citizenship that has been given may
not so simply be taken away. Perhaps for this very reason, discussions
of Puerto Rican citizenship in the wake of severance typically consider
the possibility that Puerto Ricans would have the option to retain their
US citizenship—to become, in effect, an island of ex-patriates.
Contemplating the end of US sovereignty and citizenship in Puerto
Rico, Dick Thornburgh—the former Attorney General and
Republican politician who has consistently supported selfdetermination for the island46—concludes:
History and U.S. law show that U.S. citizenship will
end in one of two ways. When the independent nation
of the Philippines succeeded the Philippines
commonwealth, U.S. nationality and territorial
citizenship for persons who acquired it based on birth
in the territory ended and all persons so situated
became aliens under U.S. law. Those residing in the
United States were repatriated to their homeland in the
new republic of the Philippines, except for those who
met residency requirements in the states of the Union
and thereby were permitted by Congress to become
candidates for naturalization. The other option,
exemplified by in the case of the succession from
Spanish to U.S. sovereignty, provides for an election of
allegiance to be allowed, requiring a choice of
nationalities but not allowing dual nationality to be
created by U.S. law or as part of the succession
process.47
44. Perea, supra note 16, at 140, 156. See, e.g., Baldwin, supra note 20, at 415 (arguing against
giving “the ignorant and lawless brigands that infest Puerto Rico . . . the benefit[s] of” the
Constitution).
45. 182 U.S. 244, 279–80 (1901).
46. See generally DICK THORNBURGH, PUERTO RICO’S FUTURE: A TIME TO Decide (2007).
47. Richard Thornburgh, Puerto Rican Separatism and United States Federalism, in FOREIGN
IN A DOMESTIC SENSE, supra note 10, at 349, 350.
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Would the second of these options—which seems to be the
overwhelming preference—solve all of the problems described here?
As far as citizenship is concerned, it would. But that simply reinforces
the conclusion that citizenship is non-negotiable.
In Balzac v. Porto Rico, the Court effectively tried to draw a
distinction between territory and citizenship, holding that the 1917
grant of citizenship to the island’s inhabitants did not change their
constitutional rights, so long as they remained residents of the island.48
Chief Justice Taft concluded that the locality, and not their individual
status as citizens, was what mattered.49 And he suggested that moving
Puerto Rico out of unincorporated territory status would take
something like an explicit act of Congress. But is that still true?
III.

DE FACTO INCORPORATION

There is reason to think that the latter point from Balzac is no
longer good law. After all, the Supreme Court has held “[i]t may well
be that over time the ties between the United States and any of its
unincorporated Territories strengthen in ways that are of
constitutional significance.”50 One federal district court has even held
that Puerto Rico has now become an incorporated territory.51 We
believe that Puerto Rican citizenship, and the corresponding limitation
on Congress’s power to expel the island, is part of that story.
Recall that, on one predominant reading, the category of
“unincorporated territories” was created precisely so as to preserve
Congress’s power to expel those territories. What differentiates them
from incorporated territories, then, is that they are subject to such a
power. If Puerto Rico is an unincorporated territory because it can be
expelled, then if it cannot be expelled it is not an unincorporated
territory. As we have shown, Puerto Rican citizenship means that the
island cannot be expelled. It follows that Puerto Rico cannot be an
unincorporated territory.
This would not mean that Puerto Rico should immediately
become a state. Instead, it would become an incorporated territory—a
step out of limbo, and toward either statehood or independence.

48. 258 U.S. 298, 309 (1922).
49. Id. at 309.
50. Boumediene v. Bush, 533 U.S. 723, 758 (2008).
51. Consejo de Salud Playa de Ponce v. Rullan, 586 F. Supp. 2d 22, 41 (D.P.R. 2008), as
corrected (Nov. 10, 2008) (“Although Congress has never enacted any affirmative language such
as ‘Puerto Rico is hereby an incorporated territory,’ its sequence of legislative actions from 1900
to present has in fact incorporated the territory.”).
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CONCLUSION
The elephant in the room is race, just as it is for Charles and
Fuentes Rohwer in their discussion of the Voting Rights Act. In the
early 1900s, we suspect that the grant of citizenship of individual Puerto
Ricans while keeping the option to expel their territory (and them) was
seen as acceptable because it was perfectly conceivable to judges and
politicians that, when the time came, those who were “Puerto Ricans”
and those who were “Americans” could be identified and separated on
the basis of race. In the event of expulsion, the latter presumably would
be given the option to retain their US citizenship; whereas the former
would not.
This seems to be what happened around the world when the
imperial powers retreated from their colonies. And the political and
economic arguments for it are easy enough to perceive. Given that the
colonies were invariably significantly poorer than the ruling
metropolis, too many from the colonies – on pure economic grounds –
would have taken the option to keep that extra passport.
But things have changed (we hope), at least as a matter of US
constitutional law. Congress could not say to our hypothetical John
Paulson, living in his mansion on the Puerto Rican mainland, “You get
to keep your US passport, and vote in Connecticut elections at our
local embassy in San Juan in the future,” while telling his neighbor,
Daniel Morales, “You finally get the right of independence that we
know you always wanted. Bye bye and good luck.”

